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Security and the claim to privacy 
 
When US President Barack Obama addressed the data mining and analysis 
activities of the National Security Agency he appealed to a familiar sense of the 
weighing of the countervailing forces of security and privacy. “The people at the NSA 
don’t have an interest in doing anything other than making sure that where we can 
prevent a terrorist attack, where we can get information ahead of time, we can carry 
out that critical task”, he stated. “Others may have different ideas”, he suggested, 
about the balance between “the information we can get” and the “encroachments on 
privacy” that might be incurred (Obama 2013). In many ways conventional 
calculations of security weigh the probability and likelihood of a future threat on the 
basis of information gathered on a distribution of events in the past. Obama’s sense 
of a trading off of security and privacy shares this vocabulary of probabilities – of a 
calculation of the tolerance for the gathering of data on past events in order to 
prevent threats in the future. Curiously, though, the very NSA programmes he is 
addressing here precisely confound the weighing of probability, and the conventions 
of security and privacy that adhere to strict probabilistic reasoning. The 
contemporary mining and analysis of data for security purposes invites novel forms 
of inferential reasoning such that even the least probable elements can be 
incorporated and acted upon. These elements of possible associations, links and 
threats do not meaningfully belong to an identifiable subject as such, much less 
belong to a data subject with a recognisable body of rights to privacy, to liberty, to 
justice.  
 
Consider, for example, two years before the controversies surrounding NSA and the 
PRISM programme, when the US Director of National Intelligence James Clapper 
testifies before the joint hearing of committees on the virtues of the algorithmic 
piecing together of fragments of data:  
 
The most valuable national intelligence is the huge collection of databases of 
routinely collected information that can be searched by computer algorithm. 
An analyst may know that a potential terrorist attacker is between 23 and 28 
years old, has lived in Atlanta Georgia, and has travelled often to Yemen. That 
analyst would like to be able to very rapidly query the travel records, the 
customs and border protection service, the investigative records of the State 
Department […] we made important progress after the December 2009 
attempted bombing of an aircraft over Detroit, but there remains much more to 
be done (US Senate Committee 2011: 16). 
 
What is sought in the director of the DNI’s vision is not the probable relationship 
between data on past activities and a future terrorist attack, but more specifically a 
potential terrorist, a subject who is not yet fully in view, who may be unnamed and as 
yet unrecognisable. The security action takes place on the terrain of a potential 
future on the horizon, a future that can only be glimpsed through the plural relations 
among data points.  
 
Now, why does a security of fragments and potentials matter to our sense of privacy, 
both as a concept and as a body of rights? In a form of security wrought via the 
assembly of data elements it is not the aim to collect a complete file of information on 
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a person, indeed incompleteness is a virtue. In the public debate the talk of 
‘metadata’ imagines that the spoken content of a telephone conversation is private 
data, whilst the call number, location, time of call and so on is ‘meta’. In fact, though, 
it is the derivative meta-data of associative links between elements that are the 
valuable data points for social network analysis. In a sense, the ‘content’ of the “dots 
to be connected” matters less to this kind of analysis than the relations between 
them. The absence of a complete record thus becomes a security virtue because it 
makes it more difficult to assume that content is ‘innocent’ – in effect, apparently 
innocent content can become suspicious because it is subsequently associated with 
other things. But of course while ‘content’ appears readily identifiable with a subject, 
the meta-data of links among multiple people and things, and among multiple parts 
of a subject are indifferent to the person as such. The individual who is the subject of 
privacy rights, and the data subject of data protection, is differently rendered in this 
mode of security. In the anticipatory analysis of data one does not need to know who 
someone is – at least not in the conventions of identification – but what they mean in 
relation to an array of possible associations.  
 
Put simply, contemporary forms of security are less interested in who a suspect 
might be than in what a future suspect may become, less interested in the one-to-
one match of the watch list or alerts index database, and more interested in the 
signals of real-time predictive analytics. The one-to-one match with an individual 
gives way to what Gilles Deleuze called the “dividual” – a “torn chain of variables” 
dividing the subject within herself, recombining with the divided elements of others 
(1992: 3). The signature of the dividual that is sought by the security software does 
not ‘belong’ to a subject as such – it does not sign off on past events, it signals 
possibilities. Thus, for example, an agreement to ‘depersonalize’ data in a database 
after a period of six months, as in the case of the EU-US agreement on passenger 
name record (PNR) data scarcely matters when what is left is a dividuated signature 
that allows for the writing of new code. So, a subject’s specific and named journey on 
a particular date may no longer be attributable in the database, but it persists as a 
source for new algorithmic code to act on future subjects. 
 
Some dividuated data elements are disaggregated from the remainder and become 
drawn into association with other elements derived from other subjects. This has 
significance even in the conventional debates about the analysis of data making us 
more secure. For example, the 2009 New York subway suspect Najibullah Zazi, the 
2009 Northwest Airlines Detroit bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, and the 2010 
Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad  could be offered as examples of the fallibility 
of a system of risk-based data analysis. Yet, though none of the suspects was pre-
emptively intercepted on the basis of the analysis of their travel or financial data, the 
fragments of data did reappear as a chain of variables for future algorithmic 
searches. In the analysis of the US Attorney General, they had ceased to be 
identifiable subjects and had emerged as “operatives with British or American 
passports or visas who had visited South Asia and had returned to the US over 
(redacted) time period” (2011: 4). It is the chain of variables of their data fragments 
that live on in contemporary border security analytics.  
 
If the subject of contemporary security measures is a fractionated subject whose 
missing elements are a resource to analytics technologies, then can we meaningfully 
conceive of a right to privacy of the dividual? Such a form of privacy would adhere 
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not to identifiable individuals but to the associations and links between multiple 
pieces of multiple people’s lives. If what is collected, analysed, deployed and 
actioned in contemporary security is not strictly personal data elements, but what I 
have elsewhere called a ‘data derivative’ – a specific form of abstraction like a 
financial derivative, that can have value that is decoupled or only loosely tied to its 
underlying coordinate – can privacy have meaningful purchase on this slippery 
derivative? One response has been to seek to restrict the use of personal data and 
to assert the right to be deleted or forgotten (Mayer-Schönberger 2009). But the data 
derivative makes associations and links that will always exceed a specified use, will 
travel and circulate with new effects and implications. Because the fragments of data 
are unmoored from specific underlying content they evade jurisdiction that requires 
an individual body or body politic.  
 
So, what might it mean to have data protection, or to limit use to defined purpose in a 
world of abstracted data signatures? The gathering of evidence of terrorist activities 
after the fact is seeping into the pre-emptive search for indicators of intent capable of 
anticipating future possible infraction. In this sense, for example, what is significant 
about the UK’s GCHQ generating 197 leads from PRISM in 2012 is not the 197 but 
how the 197are arrived at. The 197 represent persons of interest that have come to 
attention after a process of running large volumes of data through the predictive 
analytics software. It is the analytics that govern what the elements of interest should 
be – this travel associated with this financial transaction, associated with this 
presence in an open source online community, associated with this presence on 
Facebook, for example. So, put simply, the vast bulk of the filtering and analysis 
happens before any named individuals or lists are identified. It is not strictly the 
privacy of the individual that is infringed by programmes such as PRISM, but the 
harm is in the violence done to associational life, to the potentiality of futures that are 
as yet unknowable (de Goede 2012). In effect the data do not have meaning until 
sense is made of them by the relational structure of the analytics. One could protect 
data very effectively and yet still the inferred meanings of the analytics would limit life 
chances and close down potential futures.  
 
Perhaps the most significant harm, though, lies in the violence done to politics itself, 
and to the capacity to make a political claim. Where politics exists because of 
intractability and irresolvability, because of difficulty as Thomas Keenan (1997) puts 
it, contemporary data-led security offers resolution through computation, promising to 
resolve the incalculable and the intractable. The computational and algorithmic turn 
in security has no tolerance for the emergent or half-seen figure at the edges of 
perception, no interest in an unfulfilled future potential. ‘All possible links’ are 
wrought in the correlative relations that are drawn between bodies as they are 
disaggregated into degrees of risk. There is a challenge for law and human rights 
when a juridical sensibility of evidence and evaluation meets a set of security 
measures that demand the projection of future possible events yet to take place. 
Where the balance of probability may discount unverified fragments, computation 
lends greater weight to the associated elements, such that once assembled together 
their singular uncertainty it less easy to see.  
 
So, is privacy as a body of rights adequate to the task of protecting the capacity to 
make a political claim? If the politics of privacy is to locate space to challenge the 
analysis of ‘big data’ (Boyd and Crawford 2013), then, one step may be to make a 
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distinction between privacy as a body of rights and privacy as a claim that can be 
made. The body of rights, as Costas Douzinas (2000; 2012) reminds us 
compellingly, embodies an imaginary unity of the self, a clearly identifiable subject, 
while the rights claimant is fractured and split. Whilst the right to privacy itself is 
readily reconciled within the technology – ‘anonymising’, ‘masking’, or 
‘depersonalizing’ the data, for example – the fractured subject falls beneath the 
register of recognisable rights. Yet, where the body of privacy rights is inadequate to 
the task of responding to contemporary forms of security, the claim to privacy can be 
a political claim made by those whose experiences and lives are not registered in a 
body of rights.  
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